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International relations in the 20th century were largely determined by politics of economic hegemonies 
and military confrontation signified by 
the two world wars and a cold war. 
After 1945, the philosophical role and 
operational functions of multilateral 
bodies like the United Nations (UN) 
and World Bank (WB) were influenced 
by western countries, in particular 
the United States. However, in the 
21st century with complex and 
interconnected crises, global politics 
has necessitated a major paradigm 
shift. 
The survival of the planet and its 
assorted species demands recognition 
of multipolar power centres that 
requires the involvement of diverse 
stakeholders – in government, non-state 
actors, industry, and academia – to 
chart sustainable consensual solutions. 
Since the 1990s, the world has 
been transformed from a bipolar world 
dominated by Cold War superpowers, 
to a polycentric world with multiple 
centres of power. Globalisation has 
broken down the barriers between 
internal and external national interests, 
regional and international demands, 
local and global policies. But while 
globalisation has enabled economic 
integration with both positive and 
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negative effects, the integration of 
global politics faces serious challenges. 
Bettering intra- and inter-national 
governance presents a dilemma 
in that “we cannot always draw a 
clear distinction between domestic 
politics, i.e., politics within the state, 
and international politics, i.e. politics 
among states” (Frankel 1964: xi). The 
debate continues on how to manage 
national interests without threatening 
or destabilising world peace and 
prosperity.  
The enduring high rates of poverty 
and inequality have highlighted how 
Joseph Stiglitz in his Globalization 
and its Discontents was prescient in 
warning that the “IMF’s policies… 
failed to allow for desirable government 
interventions in the market, measures 
which can guide economic growth and 
make everyone better off” (2002: xii-
xiii). In this respect, the government of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
has offered an example of how direct 
and active state regulation is necessary 
to temper and manage the free market 
rationality. 
While progress has been made 
in the economic sphere, significant 
problems remain in the global political 
sphere in terms of bettering inter- and 
intra-governance. The world remains 
unsafe and unequal for citizens 
suffering from internecine conflicts 
in Israel-Palestine, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (AfPak), Democratic Republic 
of Congo and North Africa. What is the 
solution? Should the world community 
endorse unilateralism, in the name of 
American Exceptionalism, which the 
United States and NATO believed 
justified their interventions in Libya 
and Uganda? Or should we rather seek 
mechanisms to empower multilateral 
institutions like the Arab League, 
ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) 
to address issues that directly affect 
their member states? 
The critique by Russian President 
Putin in The New York Times (11 
September 2013) is exemplary. He 
reminds us that the “United Nations’ 
founders understood that decisions 
affecting war and peace should 
happen only by consensus” and 
that it is “extremely dangerous to 
encourage people to see themselves as 
exceptional, whatever the motivation.” 
If 20th century international relations 
were influenced by the reigning 
superpower from the West, what is the 
responsibility of the PRC as the economic 
hegemon in the 21st century? China has 
to be mindful of the recommendation 
from the October 2013 report on Global 
Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture. 
This Report specifies “the need for 
decisions enjoying universal legitimacy, 
norms setting predictable patterns of 
behaviour based on reciprocity, and 
mutually agreed instruments to resolve 
disputes” (EUISS 2010: 11-13).  Global 
governance “includes all the institutions, 
regimes, processes, partnerships, and 
networks that contribute to collective 
action and problem solving at the 
international level… Governance 
differs from government, which implies 
sovereign prerogatives and hierarchical 
authority. Global governance does not 
equate to world government, which 
would be virtually impossible for the 
foreseeable future, if ever”.   
This matter is raised in view of the 
prominent role of China in global 
governance institutions and the 
demands on its growing humanitarian 
peacekeeping missions in Africa and 
the rest of the world.  
In a changed and changing world 
order, geopolitical rivalry should not 
translate or degenerate into open 
conflict but should spur everyone 
to endeavour to operate within 
the regulations and rules of the 
international institutions. After all, 
there are more benefits for promoting 
political relations based on a win-win 
game rather than reducing competition 
to a zero-sum game where everybody 
eventually loses out, more especially 
developing countries.  
Win-win situations in political and 
economic affairs are preferable since 
they promote shared public goods. 
Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’1 approach 
offers a solution since it emphasises 
human values and ethical behaviour. 
The foreign policy analyst Yan Xuetong 
understands effective soft power as “the 
battle for people’s hearts and minds” 
grounded on “the country that displays 
more humane authority”. Accordingly, 
bettering institutions for ordering global 
politics looks beyond military might, 
economic hegemony, technological 
or educational superiority and more 
towards shared humane ideals and 
materialist standards. 
This is said in light of the fact that 
global governance still operates under 
unequal norms. “The United Nations, 
the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund are all structured 
hierarchically and are not equal. The 
United Nations distinguishes among 
permanent members of the Security 
Council, nonpermanent members of 
the Security Council, and ordinary 
member states. The World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund have 
voting structures dependent on the 
contributions of the members” (Bell 
2010: 11). 
Lessons from and for China 
What opportunities exist for China 
to influence multilateral institutions? 
Firstly, the debate on global politics 
should shift from talking about ‘clash 
of civilisations’ to ‘clash of cognitions’. 
The world is no longer easily divided, as 
some used to imagine, into chaos versus 
civilisation, cultured and uncivilised, 
or East and West. Instead the welfare 
of national, regional and global peace 
and security is linked to ethical regional 
and global political leadership. As Yan 
says, “political leadership is the key 
to national power and morality is an 
essential part of political leadership. 
Since the 1990s, 
the world has been 
transformed from 
a bipolar world 
dominated by Cold 
War superpowers, to 
a polycentric world 
with multiple centres 
of power. Globalisation 
has broken down the 
barriers between 
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Economic and military might matter 
as components of national power, but 
they are secondary to political leaders 
who act, (at least partly) in accordance 
with moral norms” (Bell 2010: 
2).2 More importantly, the desired 
synthesis of leadership and morality 
is championed in the polycentric 21st 
century because our collective crises 
demands combined joint-problem 
solving frameworks. 
Secondly, the interlinked crises 
in the world are complex. Not being 
able to master complexity decides the 
destiny of nations. As Joseph A Tainter 
argues: “complexity is a primary 
factor linking problem solving to the 
success or collapse of societies and 
institutions… For nearly three millennia 
scholars and philosophers have 
sought to understand why societies fail 
to preserve themselves” (Tainter 200: 
6). 
Fortunately, serious research 
has been done on this question of 
complexity and nation’s destiny. For 
instance, October 2013 saw the release 
of The Report of the Oxford Martin 
Commission for Future Generations 
boasting in its commission luminaries 
like Michelle Bachelet, Trevor Manuel, 
Kishore Mabhubani, and Amartya Sen. 
The prognosis from this Report states 
that “the increasing short-termism of 
modern politics and our collective 
inability to break the gridlock which 
undermines attempts to address the 
biggest challenges that will shape the 
future” has to be confronted head-on. 
They say this for the simple reason that, 
in the long run, “This could be our best 
century ever or our worst” (2013: 6). 
What practical recommendations 
do they propose? The Commission’s 
Agenda for the Long-Term is structured 
around five practical futures:
1. Creative coalitions requiring multi-
stakeholder partnerships. 
2. Open and reinvigorated institutions 
for the modern operating 
environment.
3. Revaluing the future by reducing 
bias against future generations. 
4. Investing in younger generations 
to promote a more inclusive and 
empowered society. 
5. Establishing a common platform of 
understanding to address today’s 
global challenges… through 
renewed dialogue on an updated 
set of shared global values around 
which a unified and enduring 
pathway can be built.
21st century global politics requires 
cooperation more than competition 
and interdependence more than 
independence. 
Conclusions
As a rising superpower following 
in the footsteps of global hegemons 
like the Roman, British and American 
Empires, China stands at a crossroad. It 
can either replicate the rise, decline and 
fall of its antecedents or chart a sensibly 
different course in order to better 
compete sustainably in global politics. 
Firstly, China’s peaceful rise 
provides a promising beginning in not 
seeking to be messianic and aiming 
to convert people to its worldview, 
philosophies and governing values. 
What it does request of the world about 
how to interact with its civilisational 
model is understanding and tolerance. 
Secondly, China should recognise that 
military might or economic strength 
should be utilised prudently in a 21st 
century of polycentric power centres. 
Thirdly, ideological fundamentalism 
is irrelevant in an open bazaar of 
ideologies that range in values and 
geographic orientation. Fourthly, Marc 
Lanteigne argues, “What separates 
China from other states, and indeed 
previous global powers, is that not 
only is it ‘growing up’ within a milieu 
of international institutions far more 
developed than ever before, but 
more importantly, it is doing so 
while making active use of these 
institutions (such as the World Trade 
Organisation) to promote the country’s 
development of global power status’” 
(Ikenberry 2008: 4). Fifthly, since 
trappings of a globalised capitalist 
society have been accompanied by 
endemic problems, China has to prize 
Tu Weiming’s ‘humanistic vision’ 
founded on promotion of ‘dialogue 
among civilisations’ which directly 
aims “to transcend anthropocentrism, 
instrumental rationality, and aggressive 
individualism” (2006: 1-2). 
The clash of cognitions rather 
than civilisations characterising our 
century presents both opportunities 
and hurdles for the Middle Kingdom 
as a “great global game-changer” 
whose impact is already beginning 
to be experienced around the world 
in business, politics, financial trade, 
culture and technological spheres.  
The words of the Martiniquan Aimé 
Césaire in Cahier d’un retour au pays 
natal ring as relevant as ever, “the 
work of man is only just beginning and 
it remains to man to conquer all the 
violence entrenched in the recesses of 
his passion. And no race possesses the 
monopoly of beauty, of intelligence, of 
force, and there is a place for all at the 
rendezvous of victory” (quoted in Said 
2012: 589). 
At heart of global politics is an 
urgent need for the harmonisation 
of international norms and standards 
in global institutions, applying the 
kind of communitarian morality 
and humanistic vision articulated in 
the innovative comparative study 
of Confucianism and the normative 
ethic of uBuntu by Daniel A. Bell and 
Thaddeus Metz (2012).  ■  
Footnotes
1 Nye’s soft power is contrasted with Sheng Deng’s: 
“Sheng Deng on the other hand, traces the concept 
of soft power in ancient Chinese philosophy, arguing 
that the idea has been embedded in Chinese 
culture throughout history. The Confucian idea of 
emphasizing the ‘limitation and regulation of power’ 
and Sun Tzu’s Art of War that advocates ‘attack(ing) 
the enemy’s mind rather than attack)ing his fortified 
cities’ provide further proof of Chinese soft power 
pre-dating Joseph Nye” (Rosario 2011: 4-5).   
2 For instance, Yan distinguishes between the foreign 
policy and moral integrity of two US presidents: “if 
one compares F.D. Roosevelt as president of the 
United States during World War II and the recent 
George W. Bush, we can see what Xunzi (ca. 313-238 
BCE) means about the moral power of the leader 
playing a role in establishing international norms and 
changing the international system. Roosevelt’s belief 
in world peace was the impetus for the foundation 
of the United Nations after World War II, whereas 
Bush Christian fundamentalist beliefs led to the 
United States continually flouting international norms, 
which resulted in a decline of the international 
nonproliferation regime” (Bell, 2010: 6). 
In this respect, the 
government of the 
People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) has 
offered an example of 
how direct and active 
state regulation is 
necessary to temper and 
manage the free market 
rationality. 
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